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I. THE DECREE OF DIVORCE DOES NOT RESTRICT SATTERFIELD'S RIGHT 
TO MORTGAGE OR TO SELL THE PROPERTY. 
Appellee Homecomings alleges that the Decree of Divorce does not restrict 
Satterfield's right to mortgage or to sell the Property. Appellant Allen agrees. 
It is undisputed that Satterfield received property rights to the Property pursuant to the 
Decree of Divorce. It is likewise undisputed that Satterfield could deal with her property 
rights in an unrestricted manner, including the sale or mortgage of those rights. To argue 
otherwise would be to argue a restraint on alienation by Satterfield of her property rights 
which may or may not have been enforceable. Under the Decree of Divorce,, Satterfield had 
the unrestricted right to deal with her interest in the Property, but only her interest in the 
Property and no other. 
At issue is the nature of Satterfield's property rights. Very simply, Satterfield had fee 
title to the property, subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. 
Appellee Homecomings quotes selectively from the Decree of Divorce no fewer than 
three (3) times as follows: "The Decree specifically provided that Sarah was awarded the 
Sandy Property 'as her sole and separate property subject to no claim by the plaintiff....'" 
What the Decree of Divorce actually says is that Satterfield was awarded the Property uas her 
sole and separate property subject to no claim by the plaintiff except as set forth in this 
paragraph [paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce]." [emphasis added]. Satterfield was 
awarded the Property subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. 
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Any assignee, transferee or mortgagee choosing to deal with Satterfield could acquire 
no more than Satterfield had. Thus, any assignee, transferee or mortgagee of Satterfield 
could only acquire an interest in the Property subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary 
interest. 
Appellee Homecomings makes the reverse argument that if Appellant Allen's 
reversionary interest were to have priority over subsequent mortgages, it would effectively 
limit post-divorce dealings with the property by Satterfield. In actuality, post-divorce 
dealings would be limited only if the party to those dealings was unwilling to take 
Satterfield's interest in the Property subject to Appellant Allen's reversionary interest. 
Coincidentally, this is what a reversionary interest is all about. 
Appellee Hall argued in the lower court that he didn't know what he was doing in the 
acquisition of the Property and that Appellant Allen had a duty to protect him, ostensibly in 
part because Appellant Allen was experienced in real estate matters. Appellee Hall has 
chosen not to defend this appeal. However, Appellee Homecomings has picked up with 
Appellee Hall's same arguments. Appellee Homecomings argues that the recordation of a 
reversionary interest is not sufficient notice to an unwary lender and that Appellant Allen has 
the additional duty to somehow prevent Satterfield from dealing with her pioperty rights in 
the Property. For the reasons stated above, Satterfield's rights in the Properly are what they 
are and she was free to deal with them. The inescapable fact is that Appellee Homecomings 
is a national mortgage company with no small familiarity of real estate matters and it is 
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disingenuous for Appellee Homecomings to argue that this train wreck was Appellant 
Allen's fault. 
Appellee Homecomings argues that the Decree of Divorce does not prohibit 
Satterfield from selling or mortgaging the Property and therefore the Decree of Divorce is 
ambiguous. For the reasons stated above, Appellant Allen agrees that the Decree of Divorce 
does not prohibit Satterfield from selling or mortgaging the Property. However, it is an 
unequivocal principle of real property law that an owner can convey no more rights than he 
has. The Decree of Divorce is not ambiguous, but clear on its face. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE INTENT 
OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
Appellee Homecomings argues that to enforce Appellant Allen's reversionary interest 
would unjustly enrich him. If this argument is taken to its logical extreme, a reversionary 
interest would be a property interest only for those who chose to recognize it, For those who 
chose to ignore it, a reversionary interest is not an interest. Appellee Homecomings chose 
to loan money to Satterfield, with the loan secured by Satterfield's interest in the Property. 
Appellee Homecomings should not be allowed to place its corporate head in the sand and 
claim that it did not know what interest Satterfield had in the Property or, worse yet, 
Appellant Allen is responsible for not protecting Appellee Homecomings from itself. 
Appellee Homecomings alleges that Appellant Allen delayed in asserting his claim, 
thereby causing damage to Appellee Homecomings. Satterfield moved from Utah in July 
1999 and shortly thereafter Appellant Allen made demand on Appellee Hall pursuant to the 
reversionary interest. When the parties were unable to reach a satisfactory resolution, 
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Appellant Allen commenced legal action in May 2000. Appellee Homecomings further 
alleges that had Appellant Allen commenced an action in January 1998, Appellee 
Homecomings would not have suffered any loss. The obvious flaw here is that Appellant 
Allen had no cause of action until Satterfield moved more than 50 miles from Salt Lake City, 
Utah, an event that did not occur until July 1999. 
Based on the foregoing facts and arguments, Appellant Allen asks this Court to 
reverse the district court's ruling in this matter. 
DATED January V_, 2004. SWENSEN & ANDERSEN PLLC 
James G. Swensen, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant David 
J. Allen 
r 
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ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary for this Brief. 
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